Are Quantum States Subjective? by Pradhan, R. K.
1 
 
Are Quantum States Subjective? 
 
 
Rajat Kumar Pradhan* 
Rajendra College, Bolangir, Odisha, India-767002. 
                                                                     
 
 
 
Abstract 
 
 
The subjective nature of the quantum states is brought out and it is argued that the 
objective state assignment is subsequent to the subjective state of the observer regarding his state 
of knowledge about the system. The collapse postulate is examined in detail to bring out the 
inherent subjectivity of the quantum state. The role of doubt and faith in quantum state 
assignment is examined.  
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1. Introduction 
 
The problems of the interpretation of quantum theory [1-13] have long since engaged the 
attention of physicists and philosophers alike, right from the days of its inception. The main 
problem discussed by Schrödinger[3] through the celebrated „cat paradox‟ is the „probability 
interpretation‟ which makes the theory indeterministic. The other problem is our inability to 
obtain simultaneous definite values for conjugate observables which is brought to focus by the 
„EPR-paradox‟[2]. These two paradoxes have their myriad variants [1, 4, 9] and many have been 
the proposals put forth in the literature to solve them including the introduction of the conscious 
observer [8] into the very heart of the discussions. 
Interestingly enough, these basic problems notwithstanding, the theory has had 
monumental success not only in describing physical phenomena but also in the description of 
phenomena in some other areas [11, 12, 13] as well like sociology, psychology, philosophy etc. 
The superposition postulate following originally from the linearity of the Hamiltonian has proved 
a handy tool in describing the dynamics of systems having many possible states. But, the link of 
quantum theory with the conscious observer still remains shrouded in mystery [14, 15, 16] and 
the nature of the quantum state and of the measurement process remain open to ever-newer 
interpretations [17]. 
Traditionally, QM is introduced through the following postulates: 
 Postulate-1: (Hilbert space): The normalized quantum state | > which contains 
all the information about the system is an element of a linear vector space, the 
Hilbert space, spanned by a set of appropriate basis vectors for the system.  
 Postulate-2: (Hermitian Operators): An observable is represented by a hermitian 
operator A having real eigenvalues. The basis vectors are then the simultaneous 
eigenstates of the complete set of mutually commuting observables. 
 Postulate-3: (Expectation value): The measurement results are interpreted 
statistically for a large number of identically prepared systems through the 
postulate of the „expectation value‟: 
                                         <A> = < |A| >                                      …   …   …   (1) 
 Postulate-4: (Time Evolution): The time evolution is governed by the 
Schrodinger equation:  
                                        H | > = iℏ(∂| >/∂t)                                …    …   ...   (2) 
and, finally,  
 Postulate-5: (The collapse postulate): Upon measurement of the observable A 
with eigenvalue ai, the original (linear superposition) state | > = Σici|ai> collapses 
to the state |ai> with probability Pi given by : 
 
                                       Pi=|ci|
2
=ci
*
ci=< |ai><ai| >                    …    …   …   (3)     
Where, ci= <ai| >  is the probability amplitude for the system to be found in the state  |ai>.      
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This last has been the center of attention since von Neumann‟s original work [8] bringing 
the conscious observer into the foundations of quantum theory.  
Many have been the proposals to keep out the observer and to safeguard the objectivity of 
physics [18], but the most recent works [11,12,14,17] have consistently pointed in the direction 
of an inevitable entry and a decisive role of the observer in the quantum measurement process.  
In the present work, it is argued that the state of the system is primarily a subjective 
assignment reflecting the observer‟s state of knowledge about it. The distinction between micro- 
and macro- systems made in the decoherence program [19, 20] is rather artificial, since in no 
case our knowledge of the state is ever definite. This is primarily because, in reality, as explained 
by Dirac [21] we never measure any exact eigenvalue, but rather a value having a spread (error 
or uncertainty) depending on (a) the system, (b) its interaction with the environment, (c) the 
observable measured, (d) the measuring apparatus and, possibly, as required in QM, (e) the 
observer.  
Thus the assignment of an exact eigenvalue neglecting the spread (and an exact 
eigenstate) is therefore a subjective affair even for microscopic systems like the H-atom and is 
only theoretically justifiable as a convenient idealization. If this were not the case, and if indeed, 
we had really exact eigenvalues and states we would never have heard of fine structures in the 
spectral lines of atoms. It is clear that there is always an inevitable superposition of states within 
the spread irrespective of whether the system is microscopic or otherwise. The only difference is 
that for microscopic systems we are forced to accept the superposition of states while for the 
macroscopic ones we habitually disregard them as of no consequence. 
In section-2, the subjective nature of the quantum state is brought out by a detailed 
analysis of the collapse process in a quantum measurement. In section-3, the central role played 
by the observer‟s doubt and faith in state assignment is considered before concluding in section-4 
with a discussion of the main results. 
2. The Subjective nature of quantum states 
 Consider a system described by the Hamiltonian H. In the measurement of an observable 
A, the general pre-measurement state | > = Σici|ai> collapses to the eigenstate |ai> with 
probability |ci|
2
 . If [H, A] = 0, then the final state will be the simultaneous eigenstate of H and 
A. If they are incompatible, then the eigenstate |ai> will no longer be an energy eigenstate but 
will be a superposition of the energy eigenstates |en > defined by : 
                                                  H |en > = εn |en >                                                     …   …   …   (4) 
 Thus, the assignment of probabilities to the occurrence of eigenvalues is a consequence 
of our ignorance of the state before measurement, since just after the measurement the state is 
definitely known to be |ai>. A definite knowledge gets rid of the probabilities. Prior to the 
measurement, the observer must know the Hamiltonian and, if possible, the complete set of 
mutually commuting observables. This, itself requires some knowledge of the system‟s 
constitution, which can only be obtained through experiments.  
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 Both classical as well as quantum probabilities are due to a lack of complete knowledge 
of the state or of the measurement outcome, but the difference lies in the fact that the classical 
probability is the squared modulus of the corresponding quantum probability amplitude. This 
leads to the appearance of quantum interference terms in the calculation of probabilities for a 
superposed state. 
 Probability is a measure of the inadequacy in our knowledge and that the quantum state is 
our subjective assignment depending on our state of knowledge, the notion of objective state 
vector reduction (independent of the observer) due to coupling with the classical macroscopic 
environment in the decoherence program then becomes an assumption which is based on the 
presumed exactitude of classical knowledge of the macro-state of the environment. As long as 
the classical system has an (inevitable) spread in the values of observables, so long the 
microstate (of the quantum system coupled to the classical one) corresponding to the same 
observable will be a superposition. The probability amplitudes are either calculated theoretically, 
in which case we must have performed measurements yielding sufficient knowledge of the 
constitution of the system and its coupling to the environment, or, are measured experimentally 
as square root of the corresponding probabilities.  
 We wish to prove that the reduction or definite knowledge is registered, exactly where 
there was the superposition or the inexact knowledge, i.e. in the particular observer’s 
consciousness.  
Suppose, two observers o1 and o2 share the same knowledge of the pre-measurement state 
| > = Σici|ai>. Now, let‟s say, observer o1 makes a state-reducing measurement, collapsing it 
objectively to a particular eigenstate |a1> and then subjectively coming to the confirmation of the 
post-measurement state being truly |a1> upon the observation of the pointer state of the 
measuring device. 
Now, as long as o2 does not know about the reduction, he will continue to assign the 
same old (pre-measurement) state | > to the system in spite of the objective reduction as well as 
the subjective knowledge in o1‟s consciousness about its reduction to |a1>. Since the first 
quantum postulate states that the wave function contains complete information about the system, 
o2 can be said to have incomplete or, at least, partially complete information compared to o1.  
But, if both of them make a large number of fully independent measurements on such 
identically prepared systems, they will doubtless verify their common knowledge | > of the 
premeasurement superposition state | >.  
However regarding the outcome of a single measurement by each observer, there are 
three distinct possibilities that arise for o2 to assign a state to the same system following o1‟s 
measurement: 
I. o2 knows neither about the measurement nor about the outcome:  Without any 
knowledge of o1‟s measurement, if o2 makes a measurement on the same system shortly after o1, 
then she will definitely get the state |a1>. This can be predicted with certainty by o1, but o2, 
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without knowing about o1‟s interaction with the system, will interpret it as having come about 
due to the collapse, which had a prior probability of |c1|
2
.  
II. o2 knows about the measurement, but not about the outcome: She will assign a new 
state | ´> to the composite system (original system plus apparata) because of her enhanced 
knowledge of the interaction of o1‟s measuring apparatus with the system:  
                                    | ´> = Σici |ai>|di>                                                                  … …   …   (5) 
Where |di> are the states of the measuring device commonly called the „pointer sates‟. 
Now, It is this new state | ´> that will collapse in o2‟s consciousness to |a1> with probability 
|c1´|
2
, if she makes another measurement quickly to ascertain the state. 
III. o2 knows about the measurement as well as the outcome : In this case naively, and 
habitually, we take it for granted that o2 will assign the state |a1> to the system since it is the 
common objective knowledge of the outcome of a scientific measurement.  
However, here also caveats are there since, only if o2 has faith in the outcome, then and 
only then the state collapses in her consciousness with the rise of definite knowledge, and no 
further measurement is required for her to assign the state. But if doubts arise regarding the 
outcome, then the lack of definite knowledge in o2‟s consciousness will require a further 
measurement to ascertain the state of the system which may or may not tally with o1‟s result 
obtained previously, depending on whether the state is a stationary one or not, and also, on the 
time elapsed in case it is allowed to evolve into a superposition again.  
Thus, in all the three cases we see that in general the two observers do not agree with 
each other in regard to the state of the system even after a measurement by one of them. This is 
called „weak objectivity‟ in a recent essay by d‟Espagnat [22]. 
We therefore turn now to the role of doubt and faith in quantum physics and its 
applications in particular so that a better appreciation of the role of the conscious observer can be 
obtained. 
3. Role of doubt and faith in quantum physics 
It is clear from the above discussion that, a doubt can be represented as a superposition 
and faith as a reduction or collapse. If, for any reason whatsoever, there is doubt in o2 regarding 
the results of o1‟s measurements, then her lack of definite knowledge is as good as a 
superposition, and she needs to perform a second measurement immediately to ascertain the state 
for herself and thereby have the superposition collapse. If on the other hand, she puts her faith in 
the results of the first measurement, then the state automatically collapses in her consciousness 
leading to definite knowledge.  It is to be noted that sometimes, for some reason or the other, we 
may have doubts regarding the validity of our own observations and in that case the same 
reasoning as above also applies i.e. a superposition occurs and a fresh measurement is called for 
to effect a collapse. 
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However, doubt and faith are aspects or functions of consciousness of the observer and 
not of the system under consideration! Also, this shows that our collective unanimity of faith in 
the truth of the outcome of a certain experiment or of an analysis is what grants objectivity to 
phenomena.  
Interestingly enough, Physics has benefitted from both, doubts and faiths, in a big way! 
For example, Einstein doubted the absoluteness of space and time held by Newton and 
propounded the theories of relativity, while Feynman had faith in Dirac‟s „mysterious‟ remark on 
the weights for the paths and was led to the path integrals. On the experimental side, Planck had 
faith in the experimental curve obtained for radiation intensity from a black body and this led 
him to the quantum hypothesis to get a neat fit to it. Had he doubted the curve, he would never 
have proposed the quantum hypothesis!  
Einstein‟s doubts about the validity or veracity of the „uncertainty principle‟ led him to 
propose many gedanken experiments during the Solvay conference of 1927, which all were 
refuted by Bohr with his faith in the validity of the same. The most famous and fruitful one in the 
series of these proposed experiments, was the celebrated EPR- paradox. Also Schrodinger‟s „cat 
paradox‟, the de Broglie-Bohm pilot wave theory and the hidden variables theories (HVTs) 
similarly arose out of such doubts about the validity of the probability interpretation. 
An experiment is performed either to gather new data, or to verify or refute a claimed 
experimental fact or theoretical prediction, or to improvise upon an earlier result in regard to its 
accuracy. Both doubt and faith may be seen to be lurking behind all these sincere efforts, though 
it has to be admitted that these doubts and faiths in scientific pursuits are more of the reasoned 
and rational category. In many instances, these are seen to be of the intuitive category also (like 
Einstein‟s doubt about the absoluteness of space and time which led to Relativity).  
The differential operators of Schrödinger‟s wave mechanics, the hermitian operators of 
Heisenberg‟s matrix mechanics and the linear vector (Hilbert) spaces of Dirac‟s formulation are 
all acceptable to us, primarily because of our doubt (lack of definite knowledge) about the exact 
state of a system which provides the basis for the expansion postulate of quantum mechanics. 
Because, the premeasurement state of a quantum system cannot be known exactly, we accept 
these formulations as valid descriptions and then the probability interpretation naturally follows. 
Similarly also, the inability to ascertain the exact path that a system follows leads to the 
acceptance of Feynman‟s path integral formulation. Therefore, what subjectively is a doubt is 
construed (or reflected) objectively as a probability in a superposition of quantum states.  
And, interestingly, what subjectively is a firm faith, mostly resulting from mathematical 
analyses,  is often seen to be realized as an objective fact like in the case of the verification of so 
many theoretical predictions viz. the existence of the positron, the neutrinos, the Ω- hyperon and 
also of the massive vector bosons W
±
 and the Z
0 
! 
Now, knowledge or the lack of it ( i.e. faith or doubt) is a property of the consciousness 
and this is seen to be at the back of all our formulations of quantum mechanics. We can say that 
the quantum state usually ascribed to a system is a representation of our knowledge (or the lack 
of it) of the system. The quantum state is primarily in the observer‟s consciousness, and it 
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represents the state of the particular observer‟s consciousness in respect of that particular system. 
The seeming objectivity comes about on account of the collective faith reposed in the ascribed 
state and it may be abandoned at any moment as and when „subjective knowledge‟ contrary to 
the assigned state start coming to the surface leading to doubts, and then we would require fresh 
experiments to ascertain the state all over again. 
4. Discussion and conclusion 
 The quantum state of a system has both objective and subjective representations. From 
the foregoing analysis it seems that we have to develop a more complete view of the 
measurement process as „an arrangement of apparata that connect the subject and the object in 
a manner as desired or designed by the subject and the outcome has always a two way effect- it 
not only collapses the state of the object but also that of the subject!‟ Now, which one collapses 
first? Objectively speaking, the information from the apparatus goes to the subject whereby she 
comes to know about the collapse and thus the subjective collapse is latter than the objective 
collapse.  
However, from the subjective view, the premeasurement state was assigned by the 
subject basing on her knowledge of the possible states of the system. The state assignment thus 
proceeded from the subject to the object. After the measurement, the state assignment again 
follows from the subject to the object but not before the information from the apparatus  reaches 
her, thereby collapsing her subjective state first. Then only, the definite knowledge of the 
collapse having taken place arises and she can say that the objective state has collapsed. Thus, 
the subjective collapse precedes the objective collapse as far as cognition of the collapse is 
concerned. As long as the subjective knowledge of the observer about the state remains 
uncertain, so long the state assigned by that particular observer will be a superposition, no matter 
what the state is for other observers. This corroborates the analysis made by Mould[23]. 
The above very simple analysis suggests that the quantum state is not an observer-
independent assignment. In Rovelli‟s Relational Interpretation[24], the relative nature of the 
quantum states is taken in but the formulation falls short of granting conscious status to the 
observer. For Rovelli, any interaction of anything with the system qualifies to be called a 
measurement. We are of the view that “the interaction of the apparata with the system makes up 
only the objective part of the measurement and the observation of the result by the conscious 
observer is the indispensable subjective part needed to complete the process of measurement, 
leading to the rise of definite knowledge.”  
In this work, we have argued that both the subject and the object are affected by a 
measurement and that there is a collapse in both. It seems that we have to admit the fact that the 
quantum state not only has a subjective aspect but also that the subjective and the objective states 
are like mirror images[25] of each other, when they come into being via measurement. 
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